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MANAGING CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS: 







Researchers and business thought leaders have emphasized that, towards 
maximizing the lifetime value of customers, firms must manage customer relationships for 
the long term. In contrast to this recommendation, we demonstrate that firm profits in 
competitive environments are maximized when managers focus on the short term with 
respect to their customers. Intuitively, while a long term focus yields more loyal customers, it 
sharpens short term competition to gain and keep customers to such an extent that overall 
firm profits are lower than when managers focus on the short term.  Further, a short term 
focus continues to deliver higher profits even when customer loyalty yields a higher share-of-
wallet or reduced costs of service from the perspective of the firm. Intuitively, while such 
revenue enhancement or cost reduction effects enhance the proverbial pot of gold at the end 
of the rainbow, they lead to even more intense competition to gain and keep customers in the 
short term. These findings suggest that the competitive implications of a switch to a long 
term customer focus must be carefully examined before such a switch is advocated or 
implemented. Paradoxically, customer lifetime value may be maximized when managers 
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MANAGING CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS: 







A stable customer base increases the value of the firm to its owners. Accordingly, 
researchers and business thought leaders have held that firms must manage their customers 
for the long term in order to maximize customer lifetime value (CLV, henceforth) (e.g., 
Blattberg and Deighton 1996; Blattberg, Getz, and Thomas 2001; Rust, Zeithaml, and Lemon 
2000; Winer 2001).  This view has guided recent initiatives related to customer relationship 
management (CRM). 
In this paper, we ask whether marketing managers in the field must really focus on 
the long term with respect to their customers. Our surprising answer is that overall firm 
profits are higher in competitive environments when their managers maximize short term 
profits from customers. Specifically, we demonstrate using a game theoretic framework that 
rotating managers in charge of the customer base so that each manager is focused only on 
short term profits yields higher overall profits than when managers focus on the long term. 
While a long term strategy leads to more loyal customers, it also intensifies the competition 
to gain and keep customers. This increase in short term competition can swamp the gains 
from a long term focus. Paradoxically, therefore, CLV may be maximized when managers 
focus on the short term. 
To demonstrate these results, we develop an analytical model of behavior-based pricing.   
Two firms compete over two periods, and each firm is endowed with a customer at the 
beginning of the game. Firms can offer individualized prices to customers. Ex ante, 
customers have identical switching costs, but in any given period a particular customer is in a 
“variety seeking” mode (i.e., the customer is a potential switcher) with a certain probability. 
Customers who switch firms incur a switching cost.  Firms are aware of the magnitude of the 
switching cost but do not know whether a specific customer is in a variety-seeking mode. 
These assumptions are designed to capture the randomness of switching behavior and the 
inability of firms to accurately gauge a specific customer’s propensity to switch—these are 
significant practical challenges faced by managers in the field. Firms can decide, using 
organizational arrangements or otherwise, whether their managers focus on short term or 
long term profits.1 
                                                            
1  It is well known that acquiring customers is expensive compared to serving existing customers. In the context 
of the model, this situation can be captured by a high switching cost. 2 
 
Our central focus is on a comparison of the two (symmetric) regimes that result 
when managers focus on either the short or the long term. In the first regime, managers in 
both firms are focused on the long term and act to directly maximize the lifetime value of 
customers (the resulting equilibrium is denoted by CLV-CLV). In the second regime, 
managers in both firms are rotated between periods so that each manager maximizes per-
period profits (this equilibrium is denoted by ST-ST). We find that overall firm profits under 
ST-ST are, in striking contrast to received wisdom, always higher than those under CLV-
CLV.2  
Interestingly, while scholars and business leaders have recommended a long term 
focus with respect to customers, managers in the field are often myopic on account of career 
concerns or pressures from external entities, including the stock market. Consider these 
illustrations: 
–  “At any given time, more than 40% of managers and senior executives expect to 
leave their jobs within two years” (Business Week, June 6, 2002). 
–  When managers have mobility within the labor market, they tend to make 
decisions that yield short-term gains at the expense of long-term interests of 
shareholders. This incentive arises because these managers seek to boost their 
reputation earlier, thereby boosting wages (Narayanan 1985). 
–  A participant in a CFO conference noted that the focus would shift from making 
the quarterly numbers to overall business health only “When and if the public 
and analysts start to take a more visionary and longer term look at companies, and 
stock prices stop being volatile based on quarterly earnings…” (CFO Magazine, 
June 26, 2002). 
–  A financial expert commented on the pressure to manage short-term earnings: “… 
if you were to speak to any chief executive of a public company anywhere in the 
world, or a CFO as well who deals with institutional investors on a day-to-day 
basis, they are all hide-bound these days by the requirement to have growth every 
quarter” (ABC Radio National Australia Report, Feb. 8, 2003). 
Our findings suggest that this short term focus commonly encountered in the field 
can yield some unexpected benefits. However, our basic analysis does not accommodate the 
argument that long lived customers are typically more profitable, either because they tend 
to spend more with the firm (a “revenue expansion” effect) or because they are less costly to 
serve (a “cost reduction” effect).  Ostensibly, cultivating customers with an eye on the long 
term would be more profitable here. We demonstrate that this argument is not necessarily 
correct. While these effects do enhance the proverbial pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, 
they also increase the intensity of short run competition to gain and keep customers. 
Correspondingly, profits under ST-ST remain higher than under CLV-CLV even when such 
effects apply.3  
In §2, we describe related work. The basic model is presented in §3. The equilibria 
that result when each firm can choose between a CLV and ST focus for its managers are 
analyzed in §4. Revenue expansion and cost reduction effects are examined in §5. We 
conclude with §6.  
                                                            
2  For technical completeness, we also demonstrate that CLV-ST does not constitute an equilibrium strategy 
pairing. 
3   Reinartz and Kumar (2000, 2002) discuss why loyal customers may not be profitable for non-strategic 




The question of whether firms should act to maximize customer lifetime value in 
competitive environments has not yet been theoretically addressed. However, related research 
that has viewed competition through the lens of the customer has focused on how competitive 
outcomes are influenced by a) the presence of “loyal” and “switcher” segments, b) switching 
costs, and c) targeted prices and promotions.  
A first stream of literature has examined how the size and behavior of loyal and 
switcher segments affect competitive outcomes. In markets with a switcher segment, the 
equilibrium frequently involves mixed strategies, i.e., competing firms may choose from a 
distribution of prices, with the average price for the firm with the larger (absolute) share of 
loyals higher than that of the competitor (Narasimhan 1988). Accordingly, the periodic 
discounts encountered in competitive marketplaces may be interpreted as prices that fall 
below the upper limit of the distribution. When firms can convert a fraction of first-time 
buyers into loyals by providing a certain level of service, a firm with an initially large 
customer base will typically provide higher levels of service (McGahan and Ghemawat 
1994). This ensures that the smaller firm, which gains more from price undercutting when 
price is the only strategic variable, instead provides lower service levels and focuses on 
attracting switchers. 
A second stream of literature has focused on how “switching costs,” i.e., the 
incremental costs that customers incur in shifting between sellers, influence competition 
(e.g., von Weizsacker 1984, Klemperer 1987a, 1987b). When firms compete over multiple 
periods, such costs may lessen long run competition because the “locked-in” customers are 
less price sensitive. However, anticipating the resulting higher profits, firms compete more 
strongly to attract customers in the earlier periods—overall, firms may not be better off 
(Klemperer 1987a). When customers can foretell that the firm with the larger market share 
will charge higher future prices, they are less sensitive to early price differences. Hence, 
firms may compete less even in the first stage compared to an identical market without 
switching costs (Klemperer 1987b).4  
Switching costs can also lead to a temporary price war when a new seller enters a 
market. Here, the entrant will price low and the incumbent’s price will also fall during entry, 
but once the customers are locked-in, prices rise (Klemperer 1989). Therefore, a market with 
switching costs may be more attractive to an entrant when long run profits are considered. In 
general, markets with switching costs are more profitable than those without, even when new 
customers arrive and some existing customers leave each period (Beggs and Klemperer 1992, 
Klemperer 1995).5  
A third related stream of literature has examined how competition is influenced by 
coupons or differential prices that are targeted at individual customers. Modern developments 
in information technology have enabled more of such “behavior-based” discrimination, 
where marketing initiatives are targeted at buyers on the basis of observed behaviors. An 
interesting early finding in this context was that, while random coupon drops (i.e., “mass-
media” coupons) raise prices and profits in a competitive environment, coupon drops targeted 
specifically at brand switchers lead to lower profits (Shaffer and Zhang 1995). Intuitively, 
competitors closely match couponing activity when coupons are targeted, yielding a 
prisoner’s dilemma where each firm’s profits are reduced by the sum of the cost of 
distributing the coupons and their face value. 
                                                            
4 When products are perfect substitutes, switching costs can result in all-or-nothing results—e.g., in 
overlapping generations models, firms may alternate between selling to all of the new and all of the old 
customers (Farrell and Shapiro 1988; Padilla 1992). 
5 Klemperer (1995) analyses the competitive implications of switching costs in industrial organization, 
macroeconomic, and international trade contexts.  4 
 
When firms that compete over an infinite horizon with overlapping generations of 
customers can recognize and target their own customers with a different price (but not 
differentiate between new and existing customers of competitors), steady-state prices depend 
on three factors (Villas-Boas 1999). First, firms poach each other’s customers in 
equilibrium—this lowers prices. Second, prices are lower when customers are patient. Such 
patience sensitizes customers to current prices in any period, thereby increasing the intensity 
of price competition. Finally, firms recognize that owning a large customer base will 
intensify future price competition as the competitors will aggressively poach that clientele—
this reduces current price competition. 
Much of the existing literature demonstrates that one-to-one promotions and reward 
programs targeted at specific customers do not pay off in terms of increased profits and 
instead lead to a prisoner’s dilemma (e.g., Chen 1997; Fudenberg and Tirole 2000; Kopalle 
and Neslin 2003; Shaffer and Zhang 1995). However, those findings may be contingent on 
the assumptions that (a) all customers can potentially switch, and (b) the firms are symmetric. 
When a firm can correctly classify its own loyal customers and switchers only with a certain 
degree of probability (i.e., individual marketing is feasible, but imperfect), individual 
marketing can be profitable (Chen, Narasimhan, and Zhang 2001). Intuitively, since some 
price-sensitive switchers are mistaken to be price-insensitive loyals and receive a higher 
price, the competitor can attract them without lowering prices significantly—this softens 
price competition and supports higher profits. Likewise, when firms are differently sized, 
such promotions may reduce prices but yet be profitable on account of market share gains for 
the larger firm (Shaffer and Zhang 2002). Similarly, coupons and reward programs tend to be 
profitable when they expand the market rather than cull market share from competitors 
(Kopalle and Neslin 2003). 
The specific issue of whether firms should adopt a long term focus with respect to 
their customers has yet to be addressed. For many firms, a long term customer focus may call 
for significant alterations in existing business strategy, operational processes, and 
compensation patterns. Before undertaking such a shift, a rigorous examination of its 





We study competition over two periods in a duopoly. Each firm “owns” one 
customer at the outset of period 1.  Each customer has a reservation utility of 1 and buys at 
most one unit of the product in each period.  In any period, each customer is a potential 
switcher with probability z — however, switching occurs only when the price difference 
between the firms is larger thanγ () 1 < γ . Here, z may be interpreted as a variety-seeking 
tendency and γ  as a “switching cost.” Firms do not know whether a specific customer is in 
variety seeking mode. Marginal costs, fixed costs and the discount rate are set to zero. Firms 
offer prices to customers that could vary depending on whether a customer currently is with 
the firm or its competitor, i.e., prices can be targeted at zero cost. Customers purchase from 
the firm that offers them the highest utility.  
The game sequence is as follows. At the outset of period 1, each firm “owns” one 
customer. Further, the owners of each firm decide whether their managers adopt either short-
term, i.e. period-by-period, profit maximization (denoted by ST) or long-term profit 
maximization that maximizes the sum of the profits across the two periods (denoted by 
CLV). Next, each firm offers two prices, one for its own customer and the other for the 
competitor’s customer. Customers purchase from the firm that offers them the highest 
(positive) utility, possibly switching firms in the process. In period 2, each firm again offers 5 
 
two prices, one for its own customer and the other for the competitor’s customer. Customers 
again make choices on observing these prices. 
We first analyze a single-period game to set up a benchmark case—here, CLV or ST 
yield identical outcomes. The benchmark case also helps clarify the mechanics of the model.  
 
1. Benchmark case (One period model) 
Each firm begins the period with a customer. Denote firm 1’s profit from its 
customer during the period as  A π  and firm 2’s profit from the same customer as B π . Let 
prices offered to this customer of firm A by the two firms be A p and  B p , respectively. Now, 
if firm 1 charged a price of 1 (the reservation utility), it is guaranteed a profit of (1 – z), 
which is the probability that the customer is a non-switcher. Therefore, firm 1 will not price 
below  () z − 1 , because expected profits from the customer would always be below the 
guaranteed profits for such a price. Firm 2 will not charge below 0, its marginal cost. Figure 1 
describes the range of these prices.6 
We assume that there is always a positive likelihood of customer “churn” in 
equilibrium—this case is both more practically relevant and more theoretically interesting.7  
The condition that ensures a positive probability of switching is γ + > B A p p , i.e., the 
differences in prices charged by the firms must exceed the switching cost.  Now, note that the 
lower limit of firm 1’s price is (1-z)—for any price higher than this, the likelihood that the 
condition  γ + > B A p p  holds is higher. If (1-z)<γ , then a pure strategy equilibrium exists. 
Here, firm 1 will price at infinitesimally below γ  (which is greater than the lower limit 1-z) 
and keep the customer for sure with a resulting profit of γ , while firm 2 prices at 0, does not 







We focus on the case that is more interesting from theoretical and practical 
viewpoints, i.e., where (1-z)>γ  (Figure 1 above). Note that: (a) If  γ − − > z pB 1 , firm 1 has 
an incentive to undercut  B p  so that  γ + < B A p p  (in this case,  A p  remains above its lower 
limit 1-z);  (b) if  γ − − ≤ z pB 1 , firm 1 has an incentive to raise  A p  to 1 (because firm 1 can 
gain a higher profit by pricing on 1 and hoping for the outcome that the customer is a non-
switcher); and (c) if  γ > A p , firm 2 has an incentive to undercut  A p  by γ .  Hence no pair of 
prices can constitute a pure-strategy equilibrium here—the potential for either undercutting 
the competitor (for both firms) or moving to the upper limit of price (in the case of firm 1) 
always exists.  
                                                            
6   It is not necessary to separately focus on the customer who begins with firm B at the outset of period 1. We 
will draw on the symmetry of the game to establish equilibrium outcomes related to that customer. 
7   If a positive probability of long-run switching did not exist in equilibrium, each firm would be essentially a 
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Following Varian (1980) and Narasimhan (1988), however, mixed strategy 
equilibrium exists. Here, firm 1’s price support is  ] 1 , 1 ( z −  (see above) and, correspondingly, 
firm 2’s price support is ] 1 , 1 ( γ γ − − − z . Let  () ( ) p p p H A A ≥ = Pr  and () ( ) p p p H B B ≥ = Pr . 
The equilibrium profits of firms 1 and 2 with respect to the customer of firm 1 are: 
A A B A p p H z z )] ( ) 1 [( γ π − + − =  [1] 
B B A B p p H z ) ( γ π + =  [2] 
For firm 1, (1-z) is the probability that the customer is a non-switcher. The second 
term, ) ( γ − A B p H z , represents the probability that the customer is a switcher but the price 
difference is smaller than the switching cost—hence, the customer does not switch to firm 2. 
We also know that () ( ) ( ) 1   and , 1 , 0 1 = = − = − A A A B B p H p H H γ γ , where  z pA − =1  is the 
lower bound on the price of firm 1. Now, firm 1 chooses the mixing strategy  (.) A H such that 
firm 2 is indifferent between choosing the lower bound price of  = B p () γ − − z 1 , in which 
case it conquers the customer with probability z (i.e., if the customer is in a switching mode), 
or any other price. Therefore: 
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  [4] 
Substituting [4] in [2]:  () γ π − − = z z B 1  [5] 
Similarly, firm 2 chooses the mixing strategy  (.) B H  such that firm 1 is indifferent 
between choosing the upper bound price of 1 (and obtaining an expected profit of 1-z, 
corresponding to the probability that the customer is a switcher) or any other price. 
Therefore: 
  () ( ) γ − + − = − A B A A p H p z z p z 1 1  [6] 
 
 or, [7] 
 
To compute the profits of firm 1, note that this firm should be indifferent between 
charging its upper bound price or any other price in its feasible support. When firm 1 charges 
a price of 1, its profits are (1-z), corresponding to the case where the customer is not a 
potential switcher: 
  z A − =1 π  [8] 
Note that firm 1 has a probability mass point at its upper bound price of 1: 
 
  [9] 
 
A few points are worth noting here. First, firm 1 charges its upper bound of 1 with a 
higher probability as the likelihood that its current customer is a potential switcher, z, 
decreases. Firm 1’s price to its own customer is relatively insensitive toγ . Overall, both 
firms charge progressively higher prices as z decreases, indicating a lower degree of 



























shifts to lower prices. Finally, the supports for the price distributions of both firms are non-
overlapping when z is low and γ  is high. Intuitively, firm 2 must draw from a distribution of 
prices with a low mean compared to firm 1 if it is to have any chance of attracting firm 1’s 
customer at all. When z is high, firm 1 tends to move its price distribution towards lower 
average prices in order to increase the likelihood of keeping its customer, and firm 2 does 
likewise in the increased hope of attracting that customer. Another finding is that the profits 
of firm 2 from firm 1’s customer first increase, and then decrease, as z increases. These 
profits are at a maximum when:  
   [10] 
 
Intuitively, when z  is low, the customer is unlikely to switch—hence expected 
profits to firm 2 from firm 1’s (current) customer are low. However, when z is high, the 
increased switching probability increases price competition—the price distributions of both 
firms shift to lower supports.  Finally, given that each firm begins with a customer, total 
profits are:  
  () γ π π π π + − = + = = z z B A 1 2 1    [11] 
 
2. A two-period model 
Having established the benchmark case, we extend the game to two periods. Figure 
2 provides a graphical description of the two-period game. Effectively, the game described 
above will constitute the 2nd period of the game—firms make 1st period decisions (with 
foresight) that can influence whether or not the customer repeat-purchases in period 2 from 
the same firm. In terms of notation, we append an additional subscript that denotes time; 
t=1,2. Accordingly, firm 1’s period 2 profits from the customer that it may own at the 
beginning of that period, and firm 2’s period 2 profits from the same customer are denoted 
by, respectively (adjusting notation in eqs. 8 and 5):  
  z A − =1 2 π ; () γ π − − = z z B 1 2  [12]   
Correspondingly, if each firm owns a customer at the beginning of period 2, the total 
firm profits for period 2 are (adjusting notation in eq. 11):  
  () γ π π π π + − = + = = z z B A 1 2 2 22 12  [13] 
where  ij π  denotes the total profits of firm i in period j. 
Let us now consider the first period. Here, firms first decide whether to compensate 
or rotate managers so that they maximize either period-by-period profits (the ST strategy) or 
total two-period profits (the CLV strategy). We assume that each firm begins period 1 
“owning” a customer.  The symmetric cases where both firms focus on either the long term 
or the short term are of particular interest. These cases represent scenarios where common 























Here, managers in both firms maximize long term profits. Consider the customer 
owned by firm 1. Firm 1’s guaranteed profits (from charging 1) are  () 2 2 1 1 B A z z z π π + − + − . 
Intuitively, the firm retains the customer with this price only if the customer is not a switcher 
(i.e., with probability 1-z), thereby obtaining revenues of (1-z) during the first period. With 
the same probability, the customer begins the next period with firm 1—if that happens, 
expected profits are () 2 1 A z π − , from the analysis of period 2. If the customer shifts to firm 2 
(this happens with probability z), the expected profits from this customer are 2 B zπ . 
Effectively, therefore, firm 1 will not charge a price below   , the price that will ensure 
that the customer buys from firm 1, where  1 A p  satisfies the condition:  
  () 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 B A A B A A A z z z p z z z p π π π π π + − − = ⇒ + − + − = +  [14] 
Firm 2 will not charge below  1 B p , where:  
  () 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 A B B B B A B p z z p z π π π π π − = ⇒ = − + +    [15] 
 
Intuitively, if firm 2 charges 1 B p , it obtains firm 1’s customer provided that 
customer is ready to switch (i.e., with probability z), thereby obtaining period 1 profits 
of 1 B p z . With probability z, therefore, this firm 2 also owns this customer at the beginning of 
period 2, in which case expected profits are  2 A zπ . On the other hand, if the customer is a 
non-switcher (with probability 1-z), firm 2 obtains zero profits during period 1 and expected 
profits of  2 B π  the next period. The sum of these profits must at least equal the “assured” 
period 2 profits from the customer if the customer remained with firm 1 during period 1 (i.e., 
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In the region  0 1 > − − γ z  (which ensures a positive probability of switching in 
period 2),  1 1 B A p p > −γ . Following the same reasoning as in § 3.1, a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium exists in period 1. In this equilibrium, firm 1’s price support is on  ] 1 , ( 1 A p  
and  firm 2’s price support is on  ) 1 , ( 1 γ γ − − A p . Let  () ( ) p p p H A A ≥ = 1 1 Pr  and 
() ( ) p p p H B B ≥ = 1 1 Pr . In equilibrium, the total profits of firm 1 from the customer it owns at 
the outset of the game are:  
    
 [16] 
 
Here, the terms that are double underlined represent period 2 profits, and the residual 
terms represent period 1 profits. Likewise the total profits of firm 2 from the customer who is 
owned by firm 1 at the outset of period 1 are:  
 
  [17] 
 
 
When strategies are mixed, firm 2’s choice of the distribution of prices should be 
such that firm 1 is indifferent between choosing its upper bound price (of 1) or any other 
price in the support of its own price distribution.  Let us evaluate firm 1’s profits at  1 A p =1: 
 
3 2
2 2 1 ) 2 ( 3 2 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( z z z z z z p B A A A A − − + − = + − + − = = = γ π π π π  [18] 
The lower bound of the support for the price of firm 1,  1 A p , can also be derived. 
Because a firm should be indifferent between all prices in its price support, on substituting 
this lower bound price in eq. [16], we should obtain the same profits as in eq. [18]. Using this 
equality and the facts that () ( ) 1 and 0 1 1 1 1 = − = − γ γ A B B p H H , we obtain: 
 
3 2
2 2 1 ) 2 ( 3 2 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( z z z z z z p B A A A A − − + − = + − + − = = = γ π π π π  [19] 
Substituting for  1 A p and  2 B π  from eq. (12) and solving for 1 A p , we obtain:  
  γ π π
2 3 2
1 2 2 1 1 z z z z z z z p B A A − − + − = + − − =  [20] 
Note that eq. [20] is identical to eq. [14]. The lowest price that firm 2 would charge 
to the customer of firm 1 is γ − = 1 1 A B p p . Any price below this would depress profits 
without increasing the probability of getting the customer to switch. Substituting this price in 
eq. [17], the profits of firm 2 from this customer are:  
 
   [21] 
 
Now, each firm owns a customer at the beginning of period 1. Therefore, the total 
profits of each firm are the sum of profits from its own customer and that of its competitor: 
4 3 2
2 1 ) 2 ( 3 ) 1 ( 2 z z z z B A
CLV CLV CLV CLV − − + − − = + = =
− − γ γ π π π π  [22] 
We next analyze the case where managers maximize short term profits. 
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2.2 ST-ST 
The managers in the first period now act as if the game ends during that period 
itself. Therefore, the period 1 outcome is identical to that obtained in the benchmark case. 
However, the strategies employed during period 1 influence switching behavior during that 
period, and hence the opening scenario for period 2.  
Let  () ( ) p p p H A A ≥ = 1 1 Pr  and  () ( ) p p p H B B ≥ = 1 1 Pr , where, following established 
notation,  1 A p  and  1 B p  are period 1 prices charged by firms 1 and 2, respectively, to the 
customer of firm 1. From the benchmark case (compare with eqs. 4 and 7), we have:  
 
 and  [23]   
 
Further, profits for each period under ST-ST are identical to eq. [11]. However, 
period 2 profits have to be adjusted by the appropriate probability that the customers remain 
with the firms. Now, the probability the customer who begins with firm 1 at the outset of 
period 1 remains with the firm at the outset of period 2 depends on both the probability that 
the customer is a non-switcher, and the probability that if the customer is a switcher, the price 
differential between the firms is sufficiently low that the customer does not switch. 











We have adjusted for firm 1’s probability mass point here (see eq. 9). When the 
customer does switch, this customer begins period 2 with firm 2, and correspondingly, firm 1 
obtains expected profits of  2 B π  from that customer in period 2. Therefore, firm 1’s total 
profits from the customer it owns at the outset of period 1 are: 
 [26] 
 
Here, from eqs. [5] and [8],  z A − =1 2 π  and  () γ π − − = z z B 1 2 . 
Next consider the customer who is with firm 2 at the outset of period 1. Firm 1’s 
expected profits from this customer during period 1 are  . 1 B π  The probability that this 
customer remains with firm 2 at the outset of period 2 depends both on the probability that 
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switcher, price differentials are sufficiently low that the customer does not switch. 





Likewise, the probability that this customer does switch to firm 1 is denoted by: 
    
   [28] 
 
Note that while we have arrived at these switching probabilities via different routes, 
reassuringly we have that  1 1 µ ψ =  and  2 2 µ ψ = . This is to be expected with symmetric firms. 
The total profits that accrue to firm 1 from the customer owned by firm 2 at the outset of 
period 1 are: 
  2 2 2 1 1 A B B
ST ST
B π µ π µ π π + + =
−  [29] 
Now, firms 1 and 2 each own a customer at the beginning of period 1. Therefore, the 
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− − + 2 2 2 1 1 A B B π µ π µ π + +  
= 1 1 2 1 2 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( B A π µ ψ π µ ψ + + + + +  = )) ( 1 ( 2 γ + − z z  [30] 
 
2.3 Comparison of CLV-CLV and ST-ST cases 
As noted earlier, CLV-CLV corresponds to the regime where managers in charge of 
customers over multiple periods seek to maximize the net present value of the customers.  In 
contrast, ST-ST corresponds to the regime where, because of external pressures or for other 
reasons, managers (who are possibly rotated between periods) maximize short term profits 
from customers. While a long term focus on customers has been frequently championed, does 
such an approach yield higher profits? In fact, it does not. Consider the following 
proposition, which constitutes the key result of the paper: 
Proposition 1: Total firm profits under the short term regime (ST-ST) are always 
(weakly) greater than those under the long term regime (CLV-CLV). 
Proof: We need to demonstrate that  ≥ =
− − ST ST ST ST
2 1 π π
CLV CLV CLV CLV − − = 2 1 π π .  From 
eqs. [22] and [30], this reduces to showing that: 
  )) ( 1 ( 2 γ + − z z   ≥   
4 3 2 ) 2 ( 3 ) 1 ( 2 z z z z − − + − − γ γ     [31] 
On simplifying, this reduces to showing that 0 )) 2 ( 1 (
2 ≥ + + − + γ z z z , i.e., 
  0 ) 2 ( 1 ≥ + + − + γ z z , i.e.:  
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Now, the probability that the customer is a potential switcher, z, is always (weakly) 
positive, as is the switching cost γ . Therefore, inequality [32] always holds.  
To obtain the intuition, note that the expected profits to each firm during period 1 
from its own customer under CLV-CLV are lower than those under ST-ST. These lower 
profits can be interpreted in terms of investments in the customers, or, alternatively as a 
“sweetener” that increases the likelihood that the customer stays with the firm. Managers 
operating in the CLV-CLV regime are open to such bribing because of the shadow of the 
future—they are pressured not to lose the customers during period 2. In fact, the notion of 
such investments in customers has frequently been supported in the popular press. The 
critical point that we highlight is that, in competitive environments, it is very likely that 
“overinvesting” occurs. Stated differently, when managers are focused on the future in a 
competitive environment, they are unable to hold back from giving customers a sweet deal 
that promotes loyalty—however, the resulting loyalty comes at a high cost. Firms are actually 
better off when, either by rotating managers between periods or otherwise, they force 
managers to maximize short term profits. 
The result established in Proposition 1 is rather general. For the entire parameter 
space corresponding to  1 ≤ +γ z , we have demonstrated that profits under ST-ST are higher. 
 
 
Equilibria in short and long term strategies 
To demarcate the competitive equilibrium where firms can choose between CLV 
and ST strategies, we need to analyze the asymmetric CLV-ST and ST-CLV cases, where 
firms adopt different strategies. The profits to the firms under the possible strategy pairings 
are captured by a standard payoff matrix, as shown below.  
  Firm 2: Strategy CLV  Firm 2: Strategy ST 
Firm 1: Strategy CLV  ( )
CLV CLV CLV CLV − − π π ,  ( )
CLV ST ST CLV − − π π , 
Firm 1: Strategy ST  ( )
ST CLV CLV ST − − π π ,  ( )
ST ST ST ST − − π π , 
 
To consider the equilibrium strategies, we need to solve the two asymmetric 
scenarios, CLV-ST and ST-CLV, where the firms adopt different strategies. Note that since 
the focus of analysis is the profits from the customer who is associated with each firm at the 
outset of period 1, the ST-CLV case is not the mirror image of the CLV-ST case. 
Specifically, the total profits of each firm are the sum of the (expected) profits from the 
customer it owns at the outset of period 1, and the (expected) profits from the customer 
owned by the competitor. Since each firm adopts a different strategy towards these 
customers, we need to also solve the ST-CLV case separately. 
The condition that ensures positive probability of switching in period 2, as explained 
earlier, is  0 1 > − − γ z . Given this period 2 condition, the following three conditions that 
govern the nature of the equilibrium in period 1 can be derived: 
 
Condition 1: Under CLV-ST, if  ,  a  pure  strategy  equilibrium 
exists in period 1 with respect to the customer of firm 1 (the firm that adopts CLV), i.e.,  there is no 
switching by this customer in period 1. 
) 1 (
1












Proof: See Appendix A 
Condition 2: Under CLV-ST, if  ,  a  mixed  strategy  equilibrium 
exists in period 1 with respect to the customer of firm 1 (the firm that adopts CLV), i.e., there 
is potentially some switching by this customer in period 1. 
Proof: See Appendix A 
Condition 3: Under CLV-ST, a mixed strategy equilibrium always exists in period 1 with 
respect to the customer of firm 2 (the firm that adopts ST), i.e., there is always potentially 
some switching by this customer in period 1. 
Proof: See Appendix A 
Given these conditions, the profits corresponding to each firm under CLV-ST can be 
derived. 
 
1 Total firm profits 
The profits of each firm under the CLV-ST and ST-CLV outcomes are described 
below.  
Result 1: When Condition 1 holds, the total profits of firm 1 (CLV) and firm 2 (ST) are: 
ST CLV − Π = ] 3 ) 1 ( 1 )[ 1 (
2 z z z z − + − + − γ  [33] 
CLV ST− Π =    [34]  
 
Proof: See Appendix A 
Result 2: When Condition 2 holds, the total profits of firm 1 (CLV) and firm 2 (ST) are: 
= Π
−ST CLV   )] ( 1 [ 2 γ + − z z  [35] 
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(While these profits can be evaluated in closed form as a function of z and γ , the 
resulting expression is complex and is not reproduced here.) 
Proof: See Appendix A 
 
2. Profit comparisons and derivation of equilibria 
As seen in Figure 3, the parameter space defined by  1 ≤ +γ z  can be divided into 
two parts, corresponding to Conditions 1 and 2. We consider the equilibria in each region 
separately. 
Condition 1:  ) 1 (
1










First, consider CLV-ST. Through simple algebraic manipulations, it can be 
demonstrated that: 
ST CLV − Π  (from eq. 33) ≥ 
ST ST− Π  (from eq. 30)   ) 1 (
1









∀ γ  [37] 
Therefore, ST-ST is not a Nash equilibrium in Condition 1, since one firm will 
unilaterally shift from ST to CLV. Next, consider CLV-CLV. It can be numerically 
demonstrated that: 
CLV CLV − Π (from eq. 22) ≥ 
CLV ST− Π (from eq. 34)  ) 1 (
1









∀ γ  [38] 15 
 
Therefore, CLV-CLV is a Nash equilibrium in Condition 1, since no firm will 
unilaterally shift from CLV to ST. The inequality in eq. [38] also implies that the firm that 
implements ST under ST-CLV has the incentive to unilaterally shift from ST to CLV—
therefore, the asymmetric strategy pairing does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. 
Summarizing these results: 
PROPOSITION 2: Under Condition 1, i.e., when  , the 
symmetric case where both firms engage in customer lifetime value maximization, i.e., 
CLV-CLV, constitutes the sole Nash equilibrium. While ST-ST does not constitute a 
Nash equilibrium, firm profits under ST-ST are always (weakly) higher than under CLV-
CLV. 
Condition 2:  2
2
1






≤ ≤ γ  
First, consider ST-ST. Comparing eqs. [30] and [35], 
ST ST− Π =
ST CLV − Π . Therefore, 
no firm has the (strong) incentive to unilaterally shift to CLV from ST, and ST-ST constitutes 
a Nash equilibrium in Condition 2. Next, consider CLV-CLV. It can be numerically 
demonstrated that: 
CLV CLV − Π  (from eq. 22) ≥ 










≤ ≤ ∀ γ
 [39]  
Therefore, no firm has the incentive to unilaterally shift to ST from CLV, and CLV-
CLV constitutes a Nash equilibrium in Condition 2. Further, the inequality in eq. (39) implies 
that the asymmetric strategy pairing does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. Summarizing 
these results: 
PROPOSITION 3: Under Condition 2, i.e., when  , both ST-ST 
and CLV-CLV constitute Nash equilibria. However, given that 
ST ST− Π ≥ 
CLV CLV − Π  
CLV ST− Π  
(see Proposition 1), ST-ST constitutes the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.  
Equilibrium regions are graphically demarcated in Figure 3. 
) 1 (
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The results indicate that for the entire relevant parametric region (i.e.,  1 ≤ +γ z ), 
firms attain the highest profit when their managers are engaged in short term profit 
maximization.  As discussed earlier, firms may indeed be locked into such a strategy on 
account of pressures from the environment, particularly from the financial market. 
Correspondingly, firms must carefully consider the advantages and disadvantages of 
disturbing this status quo before they encourage their managers to focus on the long term 
with respect to their customers. 
When firms are not locked into short term profit maximization and can instead 
choose between short term and long term (CLV) maximization, the equilibrium in incentive 
plans is a function of the specific combination of parameters z andγ . Specifically, when  z  
and/or  γ  are relatively high (the relatively small region corresponding to Condition 1 in 
Figure 3), the sole equilibrium involves the maximization of CLV by both firms, though 
profits under a symmetric short term focus (i.e., ST-ST) are higher for both firms. Under all 
other parameter combinations (i.e., Condition 2 in Figure 3), both CLV-CLV and ST-ST 
constitute equilibria. However, the ST-ST equilibrium is Pareto-dominant since each firm 
obtains higher profits here. 
Overall, our results suggest that, in competitive environments, firms likely erode 
total profits when they adopt a long term approach in seeking to maximize the lifetime value 
of their customers. While this prescription would correctly apply to a monopolist, the 
implications of adopting such a strategy for the competitive equilibrium must first be 
carefully thought through in markets where firms compete for customers. Paradoxically, 
customer lifetime value may be maximized when managers focus on the short term, rather 
than the long term. 
 
γ (Switching cost)
Condition 1: CLV-CLV is the sole Nash equilibrium
Condition 2: Both CLV-CLV and ST-ST are 






























































Proponents of customer lifetime value maximization have argued that such an 
approach can result in (a) enhanced revenues from long-term customers, and (b) lower costs 
of serving them. Since our existing analysis does not account for these effects, one may 
question whether our findings are robust. To address this issue, we extend the basic model in 
two directions. First, we allow for a “revenue expansion effect” that may occur, for example, 
when the firm gains deeper knowledge of loyal customers over time. Second, we allow for a 
“cost reduction effect” that may occur when the firm learns to efficiently serve loyal 
customers. To examine these effects, we first assume that the marginal cost of firm’s offering 
is c>0. The effects are operationalized as follows: 
(a) Revenue expansion effect: Consider a customer who begins with firm i at the outset 
of period 1 and purchases from firm i in period 1. If this customer purchases from 
firm i in period 2, the purchased quantity is (1+δ ) rather than 1, i.e., firm i gains a 
larger share of wallet.  
(b) Cost reduction effect: Consider a customer who begins with firm i at the outset of 
period 1 and purchases from firm i in period 1. If this customer purchases from firm i 
in period 2, the cost of providing the product or service to the customer 
is ) 1 ( δ − = ′ c c ,  ). 1 , 0 ( ∈ δ  
In each case, a higher value of δ indicates a stronger effect. We compare the 
implications of these effects across the two symmetric regimes, i.e., ST-ST, and CLV-CLV, 
for two reasons. First, the asymmetric cases do not emerge as equilibria in the baseline model 
without these effects (see Figure 3). Second, this substantially reduces analytical complexity8. 
The profit expressions corresponding to the CLV-CLV and ST-ST outcomes can be 
analytically derived (see eqs. a64, a76, and a77 in the Appendix). The complexity of these 
closed form expressions precludes an analytical comparison of profits across cases. In Table 
1 below, we numerically confirm that the profits under ST-ST are greater than under CLV-
CLV. 
The first two cases in Table 1 correspond to z = 0, i.e., there is no switching. Each 
firm exercises monopoly power over the customer it owns. As seen in Case 1, when there is 
no switching and, in addition, δ = 0 (i.e., there is no cost reduction or revenue expansion at 
work), profits across all strategy pairings are identical, i.e., whether the firm engages in CLV 
or ST is irrelevant. As seen in Case 2, profits are higher when δ > 0  (compared to Case 1 
where δ = 0). 
In Case 3, there is a positive, but relatively low probability of switching (i.e., z = 
0.25). Across the board, profits decrease compared to Case 2—however, note that (a) under 
both ST-ST and CLV-CLV, profits are (weakly) higher when δ = 0.25 (compared to δ = 0), 
and (b) profits under ST-ST are consistently higher than those under CLV-CLV. Similarly, 
comparing Case 3 to Cases 4 and 5, while profits decrease across the board as z increases 
(from 0.25 to 0.35 and 0.50, respectively), profits under ST-ST are consistently higher than 
under CLV-CLV. 
Comparing Case 3 to Cases 6 and 7 reveals the implications of a higher switching 
costγ . Profits decrease across the board as γ  increases (from 0.25 to 0.35 and 0.50, 
respectively). Again, profits under ST-ST are higher than those under CLV-CLV across the 
cases.  
                                                            
8  The analysis for the asymmetric cases is available from the authors on request. As before, the asymmetric 
outcomes do not constitute Nash equilibria, even when a revenue expansion or a cost reduction effect applies. 18 
 
Comparing Case 3 to Cases 8 and 9 reveals the implications of a higher revenue 
expansion (or, alternatively, cost reduction parameter) δ.  Profits increase across the board as 
δ increases (from 0.25 to 0.35 and 0.50, respectively). Again, profits under ST-ST are 
consistently higher than under CLV-CLV across these cases. 
The most interesting finding so far is that a short term focus yields higher profits 
than a long term focus even when keeping customers over the long run pays off in terms of 
either a higher share-of-wallet or a lower cost to serve. Intuitively, each of these loyalty-
driven effects enhances the value of the proverbial pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. 
However, such potential rewards accentuate the competition to gain and keep customers—the 
larger the pot, the more intense the short-term competition. Consistent with this reasoning, 
ignoring the potential to enhance the pot during the early stages of the game (as under ST-
ST) leads to higher overall profits. 
Cases 10 and 11 represent highly competitive scenarios with high customer 
switching probabilities (z) and low switching costs (γ ). As expected, profits across strategy 
pairings drop compared to the corresponding pairings within Cases 1-9. However, what is 
striking in Cases 10 and 11 is that profits under CLV-CLV and ST-ST when δ = 0 (i.e., in the 
absence of revenue enhancement and cost reduction effects) are weakly higher than the 
corresponding profits in the presence of revenue enhancement and cost reduction effects. 
Further, comparing Cases 10 and 11, profits decrease as the magnitude of these effects 
increase. 
The intuition here is that, when the market is already highly competitive, enhancing 
the value of the pot at the end of the rainbow can increase short run price competition to such 
an extent that, irrespective of whether a short term (ST) or a long term (CLV) strategy is 
adopted, overall profits decrease. Further, comparing across Cases 10 and 11, as the strength 
of the revenue enhancement or cost reduction effect increases, profits decrease further. Apart 
from these effects, though, profits under ST-ST are consistently higher than under CLV-CLV 
in Cases 10 and 11 as well. These findings attest to the robustness of our central argument 
that customer lifetime value is maximized in competitive environments when managers focus 
on the short term.9 
.
                                                            
9 A grid search of the parametric space revealed no values that contradict the key findings in Table 1. 19 
 
Table 1.:  Profits under CLV-CLV and ST-ST strategy pairings 
Cases  Parameter values 
CLV-
CLV 
(δ = 0) 
ST-ST 
















1.  c = 0.25; z = 0; γ  = 0.25  1.5 1.5 0.00  1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
2.  c = 0.25; z = 0; γ  = 0.25  1.5 1.5 0.25  1.69 1.69 1.56 1.56 
3.  c = 0.25; z = 0.25; γ  = 0.25  1.25 1.28 0.25  1.34 1.39 1.28 1.32 
4.  c = 0.25; z = 0.35; γ  = 0.25  1.09 1.14 0.25  1.14 1.22 1.11 1.17 
5.  c = 0.25; z = 0.50; γ  = 0.25  0.80 0.86 0.25  0.80 0.91 0.80 0.89 
6.  c = 0.25; z = 0.25; γ  = 0.35  1.20 1.23 0.25  1.29 1.34 1.23 1.27 
7.  c = 0.25; z = 0.25; γ  = 0.50  1.12 1.16 0.25  1.21 1.27 1.15 1.19 
8.  c = 0.25; z = 0.25; γ  = 0.25  1.25 1.28 0.35  1.37 1.43 1.30 1.33 
9.  c = 0.25; z = 0.25; γ  = 0.25  1.25 1.28 0.50  1.43 1.49 1.31 1.35 
10.  c = 0.25; z = 0.75; γ  = 0.01  0.61 0.64 0.10  0.59 0.63 0.61 0.64 





Researchers and practitioners have advanced the view that, towards maximizing 
customer lifetime value, managers must adopt a long term horizon while managing customer 
relationships. However, this view may not have sufficiently accommodated the competitive 
implications of a long term approach. Our results suggest that customer lifetime value may be 
maximized in competitive environments when managers instead focus on the short term. 
A two-period model of a duopoly in which each firm began with one customer was 
first introduced. Each customer could be a potential switcher with a certain probability, and 
would incur a certain switching cost if the customer who was a potential switcher indeed 
switched firms. Using this simple setup, total firm profits under a short-term focus where the 
managers in each firm maximized period-by-period profits were shown to be always higher 
than when they maximized long term profits from the customers. Further, it was 
demonstrated that the asymmetric cases where managers in one firm focused on per-period 
profits and managers in the other focused on total two-period profits did not constitute Nash 
equilibria.  
Next, to accommodate some of the frequently highlighted benefits of retaining 
customers, each firm was allowed to either garner enhanced revenues from, or lower its costs 
to serve, customers who remained with the firm over multiple periods. However, the 
incorporation of such revenue enhancement and cost reduction effects did not alter the 
superiority of the short-term focus over the long-term focus. Finally, it was demonstrated that 
when competition is intense (corresponding to the case where the probability that customers 
were potential switchers was high and switching costs were low), a stronger revenue 
enhancement or cost reduction effect could, in fact, lower total profits, irrespective of 
whether managers focus on the short term or the long term. 
From a managerial perspective, our findings suggest that decisions to reorient 
business processes, align managerial incentives, and implement CRM technologies to 
facilitate a long term orientation towards customers deserve careful evaluation, particularly 
when these decisions are driven by normative pressures to jump aboard the bandwagon. In 
competitive environments, managers must carefully evaluate the strategic implications of 
such initiatives both prospectively and on an ongoing basis.  Managers must be alert for signs 
of increase in the intensity of short term competition, and must rigorously evaluate the 
corresponding implications for the profitability of the customer base. Further, managers must 
approach the counterintuitive notion that a short term focus may yield superior overall profits 
with an open mind. 
From a research perspective, the competitive implications of short term and long 
term foci in the context of CRM have received relatively little attention. This paper sheds 
some new light on how, contrary to popular beliefs, a long term focus can yield lower total 
profits than a short term focus in competitive environments. At the least, our findings suggest 
that informal arguments and formal models that support the superiority of a long term focus 
with respect to customers are incomplete without addressing the corresponding competitive 
implications. 
This paper represents an early effort to examine the competitive implications of 
short term and long term foci in the context of CRM. As the next step, we aim to examine the 
competitive implications of a “mixed” focus, where the components of incentive plans are 
based on both short term and long term profits.  21 
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Appendix A 
MANAGING CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS: 
SHOULD MANAGERS REALLY FOCUS ON THE LONG TERM? 
A1. Asymmetric Cases 
Under CLV-ST, firm 1 adopts CLV, and firm 2 adopts ST. Consider first 
the customer who belongs to firm 1 at the outset of period 1. If firm 1 prices at 1 during 
period 1 to its own customer, its (guaranteed) expected profits are (1-z)+(1-z)  2 A π + z 2 B π . 
This reflects the probability that firm 1 will retain the customer in period 2 only if that 
customer is a non-switcher (i.e., with probability 1-z). Therefore, firm 1 will never price 
below lower bound 
1 A p , such that: 
= + 2 1 A A p π  (1-z)+(1-z)  2 A π + z 2 B π ,   i.e., 
3 2
1 ) 2 ( 2 1 z z z pA − − + − = γ  [a1] 
The manager in firm 2 maximizes period 1 profits alone, and will not price below 
cost: 
0 1 = B p  [a2] 
Condition 1: Under CLV-ST, if  , a pure strategy equilibrium 
exists in period 1 with respect to the customer of firm 1 (that adopts CLV), i.e., there is no 
switching by this customer in period 1. 
Proof: 
We know that if 0 1 1 = ≤ − B A p p γ , there is no switching in period 1, and a pure strategy 









≥ γ  [a3] 
Here, firm 2 charges 0 1 = B p , and firm 1 charges γ γ = + = 1 1 B A p p . We know that 
the condition   for   switching   in   period   2   i s   ) 1 ( z − ≤ γ .   Also,     
because ()
2 2 1 ) 1 ( z z z + < + − . Hence, the condition for pure strategy in period 1 is the one 
given above. 
Condition 2: Under CLV-ST, if   a  mixed  strategy  equilibrium 
exists in period 1 with respect to the customer of firm 1 (that adopts CLV), i.e., there is 
potentially some switching by this customer in period 1. 
 
Proof:  
If 0 1 1 = > − B A p p γ , there is potentially some switching in period 1, and a mixed strategy 
equilibrium exists. Substituting prices from eqs. [a1] and [a2], this occurs when:  
) 1 (
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Condition 3: Under CLV-ST, a mixed strategy equilibrium always exists in period 1 with 
respect to the customer of firm 2 (the firm that adopts ST), i.e., there is always potentially 
some switching by this customer in period 1. 
 
Proof: 
Consider the customer of firm 1 under ST-CLV. In period 1, firm 1 can guarantee itself 
expected profits of (1-z) from this customer by charging a reservation price of 1—hence, it 
will not price below  . 1 1 z pA − =   Firm 2 will not offer a price below 1 B p , which satisfies: 
2 2 2 1 ) 1 ( B B A B z z p z π π π = − + + , i.e.,  2 2 1 A B B p π π − =  [a4] 
 
Now, if 1 1 B A p p < −γ , there is no switching in period 1 since firm 1 will always retain its 
customer by pricing sufficiently low. Given that  () z A − = 1 2 π  and  () γ π − − = z z B 1 2 , 
the condition translates to 2 > +γ z , which is not feasible given that both z and γ  lie in the 
interval (0,1]. Therefore, only a mixed strategy equilibrium exists in period 1. 
 
Profits under CLV-ST from customer starting with Firm 1 
Under Condition 1, a pure strategy equilibrium exists in period 1. Here, firm 2 
charges 0 1 = B p , and firm 1 charges γ γ = + = 1 1 B A p p . Intuitively, firm 1 is able to price low 
enough here that it can get the customer for sure. Firm 1’s expected profits from its own 
customer are: 
  γ π γ π + − = + =
− z A
ST CLV
A 1 2  [a5] 
Firm 2’s expected profits from the customer of firm 1 are: 
 ) 1 ( 0 2 γ π π − − = + =
− z z B
ST CLV
B  [a6] 
Under Condition 2, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists in period 1. Following 
reasoning similar to that articulated earlier, the price supports of firms 1 and 2 are 
respectively  ] 1 , ( 1 A p  and ] 1 , ( 1 γ γ − − A p .  As in case 1 (eq. a1), 
3 2
1 ) 2 ( 2 1 z z z pA − − + − = γ . 
Let  () ( ) p p p H A A ≥ = 1 1 Pr  and () ( ) p p p H B B ≥ = 1 1 Pr . In equilibrium, the total profits (across 
two periods) that accrue to firm 1 from the customer that it owns at the outset of period 1 are: 
] )] ( 1 [ ) ( ) 1 [(
)] ( ) 1 [(
2 1 1 2 1 1 2
1 1 1 2 1
B A B A A B A
A A B A A A
p H z p H z z
p p H z z
π γ π γ π
γ π π π
− − + − + − +
− + − = + =
 [a7] 
 
Likewise, the profits of firm 2 in period 1 from the customer of firm 1 are: 
  1 1 1 1 ) ( B B A B p p H z γ π + =  [a8] 




2 1 A A
ST CLV
A p π π = − + − − + − ) 1 ( ) 2 ( 2 1
3 2 z z z z γ
3 2 ) 2 ( 3 2 z z z − − + − γ  [a9] 
Similarly, evaluating eq. (a8) at firm 2’s lower bound price γ − = 1 1 A B p p , we have: 
z p p H z p p H z A A A B B A B = − = + = ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 γ γ π ) ) 2 ( 2 1 (
3 2 γ γ − − − + − z z z    [a10] 
















− − − + −
p
z z z ) ) 2 ( 2 1 (
3 2
 [a11] 
Likewise, substituting eq. (a9) into eq. (a7) and solving for ) ( 1 p H B , we obtain: 
) (













) ) 2 ( 1 (
) 1 )( 1 (
2 z z p z
p z







Therefore, firm 2’s profits from the customer owned by firm 1 at the outset of period 
1 are: 
   [a13] 
Note that since the focus of analysis is the customer associated with each firm, to 
derive the total profits of each firm in the asymmetric case, we need to first solve the ST-
CLV case as well. 
 
Profits under ST-CLV from customer starting with Firm 1 
According to Condition 3, only a mixed strategy equilibrium exists in period 1, 
when the price supports of firms 1 and 2 are  ] 1 , ( 1 A p  and ] 1 , ( 1 γ γ − − A p , respectively. As 
before, let  () ( ) p p p H A A ≥ = 1 1 Pr  and () ( ) p p p H B B ≥ = 1 1 Pr . If firm 1 charges a price of  1 A p  
to its customers, its expected period 1 profits from this customer are: 
  1 1 1 1 1 ) ( ) 1 ( A A B A A p p H z p z γ π − + − =  [a14] 
Intuitively, firm 1 obtains profits that equal  1 A p  if the customer is not a potential 
switcher—if the customer is a potential switcher, the profits then depend on the probability 
that firm 2’s price is sufficiently high that the customer decides to stay with firm 1. Firm 2’s 
total profits from this customer across the two periods equal: 
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We know that 1 ) ( , 0 ) 1 ( 1 1 1 = − = − γ γ A B B p H H , and 1 ) ( 1 1 = A A p H . Evaluating eq. 
[a14] at 1 1 = A p , and using the fact that in a mixed strategy equilibrium firm 2’s mixing 
probabilities must be such that firm 1 is indifferent between pricing at any point in its price 
support, we have: 
z A − =1 1 π  [a16] 
Likewise, evaluating eq. (a15) at the lower bound of firm 2’s price support (i.e., 
at γ − − = z pB 1 1 ), firm 2’s total profits from the customer who begins with firm 1 are: 
2 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( A B
CLV ST
B z z z z π π γ π + − + − − =
− = )] 4 ( 2 3 [ γ γ − − − − z z z  [a17] 
Evaluating eq. [a15] at  p pB = +γ 1  and equating the resulting expression to eq. 















− + − −
=  [a18] 
Note that the corresponding distribution of firm 1’s prices to its own customer has a 
mass point at 1 1 = A p . Evaluating eq. (a14) at  p pA = −γ 1  and equating the result to eq. [a16], 
we obtain: 
















) ( 1 γ p z
z
p H B  [a19] 
The total profits of firm 1 from its own customer can now be specified: 
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 [ a20] 
Note that while computing profits in eq. [a20] we have adjusted for firm 1’s 
probability mass point at  . 1 1 = A p  Having solved the CLV-ST and ST-CLV cases, we can 




The profits of the firm that engages in CLV are the sum of the profits from its own 
customer and that of its competitor (ST).  When Condition 1 holds (Result 1), the total 




− − + + − = Π π γ 1] 3 ) 1 ( 1 )[ 1 (
2 z z z z − + − + − γ = [a21] 
The total profits of firm 2 (ST) are the sum of the profits from its own customer and 
from the customer of its competitor (CLV), i.e., the sum of eqs. [a6] and [a20]: 


















− − − − − +
− − − − + + + + − − −
− −
) - z - (2 z - - 2
- z - 2
Log )] 2 ( 1 )[ 2 (
)] 1 ( ) 1 )( 2 2 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( )[ 1 (
) 1 (
1





γ γ γ γ
γ z z z




CLV ST z z
− − + − − = Π π γ) 1 (27 
 







ST CLV − − − + = Π π π = )] ( 1 [ 2 γ + − z z  [a23] 






CLV ST − − − + = Π π π  [a24] 
 
CLV ST− Π 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( A z z π − + − =   
 
  [a25]  
where:  () γ π π − − = − = z z z B A 1 ; 1 2 2 ; 
() γ π π π − + − − = 2 2 1 1 B A B z z z z ;  
3 2
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MANAGING CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS: 
SHOULD MANAGERS REALLY FOCUS ON THE LONG TERM? 
 
To incorporate the revenue expansion and cost reduction effects, we first solve a 
model with a positive marginal cost. 
 
B1. Period 2 model with a positive marginal cost c  
We first solve the benchmark case (one period model) with a positive marginal cost 
c but without the application of a revenue enhancement or cost reduction effect. As before, 
each firm begins the period with a customer. Denote firm 1’s profit from its customer as  A π  
and firm 2’s profit from the same customer as B π . Let prices offered to this customer from 
these two firms be A p and B p , respectively. Now, if firm 1 charges a price of 1, it is 
guaranteed a profit of (1-z)(1-c), which is the probability that the customer is a non-switcher. 
Therefore, to avoid receiving less than these guaranteed profits, firm 1 will not set a price 
below A p , such that ) 1 )( 1 ( c z c pA − − = − , i.e.,  c c z pA + − − = ) 1 )( 1 ( . Firm 2 will not charge 
below cost c. 
We assume that there is always a positive likelihood of customer “churn” in 
equilibrium—this corresponds to the case where A p γ > − B p . Following the same reasoning 
as in § 3.1, no pair of prices can constitute a pure-strategy equilibrium in this region—
however, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium, firm 1’s price support is 
] 1 , ( A p  (see above) and firm 2’s price support is ] 1 , ( γ γ − − A p . Let  () ( ) p p p H A A ≥ = Pr  
and () ( ) p p p H B B ≥ = Pr . The equilibrium profits of firms 1 and 2 from the customer of firm 
1 are: 
) )]( ( ) 1 [( c p p H z z A A B A − − + − = γ π    [a26] 
) ( ) ( c p p H z B B A B − + = γ π  [a27] 
We also know that () ( ) ( ) 1   and , 1 , 0 1 = = − = − A A A B B p H p H H γ γ . Now, firm 1 
chooses the mixing strategy  (.) A H such that firm 2 is indifferent between choosing the lower 
bound price of γ − A p , in which case it conquers the customer with probability z (i.e., if the 
customer is in a switching mode), or any other price. Therefore: 
) )( ( ) ( c p p H z c p z B B A A − + = − − γ γ , i.e.,  ()
) (









γ , i.e., 
()
) (
) 1 )( 1 (
c p
c z






Substituting the expression for  () γ + B A p H  from [a28] in [a27], 
] ) 1 )( 1 [( γ π − − − = c z z B  [a29] 
Similarly, firm 2 chooses the mixing strategy  (.) B H  such that firm 1 is indifferent 
between choosing the upper bound price of 1 and obtaining a expected profit of (1-z)(1-c), 
corresponding to the probability that the customer is a switcher, or any other price. Therefore: 29 
 













p H B γ
γ 1 ) 1 (
 [a30] 
Substituting (a30) into (a26), the profits of firm 1 are: 
 ) 1 )( 1 ( c z A − − = π  [a31] 
 
B2. Period 2 model with positive marginal cost and revenue expansion effect  
This corresponds to the case where the customer begins with one firm at the outset 
of period 1, and purchases from the same firm during period 1. 
When the customer who begins with a firm at the outset of period 1 stays with the 
same firm during period 1, then the customer with a reservation price of 1 per unit purchases 
(1+δ ) units from that firm during period 2, conditional on the customer staying with the firm 
during period 2. If that customer switches firms during period 2, the customer purchases 1 
unit. 
Without loss of generality, we focus on a customer who begins with firm 1 at the 
outset of period 1 and purchases from that firm during period 1. If this customer were to 
purchase from firm 1 during period 2 as well, the purchase quantity is (1+δ ). If the customer 
is a potential switcher (i.e., with probability z), this customer shifts to firm 2 during period 2 
if the surplus gained from switching is positive, i.e., if: 
γ δ > + − − − ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( A B p p , i.e.,  γ δ − + − − < ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 A B p p  [a32] 
Correspondingly, during period 2, firm 1 will not charge its customer a price 
below A p , which guarantees that the customer is retained. This minimum price must satisfy: 
) 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 )( ( δ δ + − − = + − c z c pA , i.e.,  ) 1 )( 1 ( c z c pA − − + =  [a33] 
Corresponding to its marginal cost, firm 2 will not offer a price belowc. Comparing 
this lower bound with [a32], which denotes the condition for potential switching, and 
following the reasoning articulated earlier, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists when: 
  < B p γ δ − + − − ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 A p    [a34] 
Note that this condition corresponds to() ( ) γ δ > + − − ) 1 ( 1 1 z c . In this equilibrium, 
firm 1’s price to its customer is drawn from ( A p , 1] and firm 2’s price to the same customer 
is drawn from ( A p -γ , 1-γ ). Let the  () ( ) p p p H A A ≥ = Pr  and () ( ) p p p H B B ≥ = Pr . Given 
some A p , and employing the condition the customer who is a potential switcher does not 
switch to firm 2 (see eq. a32), the profits of firm 1 from its customer are: 
 ) 1 )( )]( ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 ( 1 [ δ γ δ π + − − + − − + − = c p p H z z A A B A  [a35] 
Likewise, profits to firm 2 from the customer of firm 1, which accrue only if the 
customer does switch (according to the condition detailed in eq. a32), are: 


















π  [a36] 
Note that  ( ) 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 , 0 ) 1 ( = − + − − = − γ δ γ A B B p H H (from eq. a34), and  1 ) ( = A A p H . 
By the definition of the mixed strategy, the expected profits to firm 1 at  = A p A p  must equal 
expected profits at  = A p 1. Evaluating (a35) at  = A p 1, we have the profits of firm 1: 
 ) 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( δ π + − − = ′ c z A  [a37] 30 
 
Next, evaluate eq. [a36] at: 












i.e.,  ) ( ) 1 ( δ γ δ + − + = A B p p  [a38] 
Following this substitution we obtain, 
  ) ( A A B p H z = ′ π  ( ) ) ( ) 1 ( c pA − + − + δ γ δ = [] γ δ − − − − ) 1 )( 1 ( z z c z  [a39] 
 
B3. Period 2 model with positive marginal cost and cost reduction effect  
Again, this corresponds to the case where the customer with a reservation price of 1 
per unit begins with one firm at the outset of period 1, and purchases from the same firm 
during period 1. When the customer who begins with a firm at the outset of period 1 stays 
with the same firm during period 1, then the costs of serving the customer per unit purchase 
decreases from c to c(1-δ) during period 2, conditional on the customer staying with the firm 
during period 2.  If that customer switches firms during period 2, the marginal cost of serving 
the customer remains c. 
Without loss of generality, we focus on a customer who begins with firm 1 at the 
outset of period 1 and purchases from that firm during period 1. If firm 1 charges a price of 1 
during period 2, the guaranteed profit is (1-z)(1-c′). Correspondingly, firm 1 will not charge 
its customer a price below A p , which guarantees the customer is retained—this price must 
satisfy: 
  ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( c z c pA ′ − − = − , i.e.,  ) 1 )( 1 ( c z c pA ′ − − + ′ =  [a40] 
Corresponding to its own marginal cost, firm 2 will not offer a price below  c pB = . 
Comparing this lower bound with [a32], which denotes the condition for potential switching, 
and following the reasoning articulated earlier, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists when: 
  < B p γ − A p  [a41] 
Note that this condition corresponds to () ( ) γ δ > + − − − c c z c 1 1 . In this equilibrium, 
firm 1’s price to its customer is drawn from ( A p , 1] and firm 2’s price to the same customer 
is drawn from ( A p γ − , 1 γ − ). Let  () ( ) p p p H A A ≥ = Pr  and  () ( ) p p p H B B ≥ = Pr . Given 
some A p , and employing the condition that the customer who is a potential switcher does not 
switch to firm 2 (see eq. a41), the profits of firm 1 from its customer are: 
 ) )]( ( 1 [ c p p H z z A A B A ′ − − + − = γ π  [a42]) 
Likewise, profits to firm 2 from the customer of firm 1, which accrue only if the 
customer does switch (according to the condition detailed in eq. a41) are: 
 ) ( ) ( c p p H z B B A B − + = γ π  [a43] 
Note that 1 ) ( , 0 ) 1 ( = − = − γ γ A B B p H H  (from eq. a41), and  1 ) ( = A A p H . By the 
definition of the mixed strategy, the expected profits to firm 1 at  = A p A p  must equal 
expected profits at  = A p 1. Evaluating [a42] at  1 = A p , we have profits of firm 1: 
 )] 1 ( 1 )[ 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( δ π − − − = ′ − − = ′ c z c z A  [a44] 31 
 
Next, evaluating eq. (a43) at , A B p p = +γ  i.e.,  γ − = A B p p , we obtain the profits of 
firm 2: 
) ( A A B p H z = ′ π ) ( c pA − −γ =  [] c c z c z − − ′ − − + ′ γ ) 1 )( 1 ( =   [] γ δ − − − − z c c z z ) 1 )( 1 (  [a45] 
 
 
B4. Period 1 model 
With foresight regarding the 2nd period, managers make 1st period decisions that can 
influence whether or not the customer repeat-purchases in period 2 from the same firm. The 
analyses described in Appendices B2 and B3 above will constitute the 2nd period under 
various conditions. In terms of notation, we append a subscript that denotes time; t=1,2. 
Accordingly, when the revenue expansion or cost reduction effects do not apply, firm 1’s 
period 2 profits from the customer that it “owns” at the beginning of that period, and firm 
2’s period 2 profits from the same customer are denoted by, respectively (adjusting notation 
in eqs. a29 and a31): 
 ) 1 )( 1 ( 2 c z A − − = π  [a46] 
 ] ) 1 )( 1 [( 2 γ π − − − = c z z B  [a47] 
When the revenue expansion effect applies to the customer owned by firm 1 at the 
outset of period 2, the corresponding profits are (adjusting notation in eqs. a37 and a39): 
 ) 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( 2 δ π + − − = ′ c z A  [a48] 
  2 B π′ =  [] γ δ − − − − ) 1 )( 1 ( z z c z  [a49] 
Instead, when loyalty pays off in terms of a cost reduction effect, the corresponding 
profits are (adjusting notation in eqs. a44 and a45): 
 )] 1 ( 1 )[ 1 ( 2 δ π − − − = ′ c z A  [a50] 
  = ′ 2 B π [] γ δ − − − − z c c z z ) 1 )( 1 (  [a51] 




Here, both managers maximize long term profits. Consider the customer who begins 
with firm 1. Firm 1’s guaranteed profits from pricing at 1 are  () B A z z c z π π + ′ − + − − 2 1 ) 1 )( 1 (,  
i.e., the firm retains the customer with this price only if the customer is not a switcher (with 
probability 1-z), thereby obtaining profits of (1-z)(1-c) during period 1. With the same 
probability, the customer begins the next period with firm 1—if that happens, expected 
profits are () 2 1 A z π′ − , from the analysis of period 2, where  2 A π′  could be drawn from either 
eqs. a48 or a50, depending on the specific effect at work. If the customer shifts to firm 2 
(with probability z), the expected profits from this customer are ( 2 B zπ ), where  2 B π  is 32 
 
detailed in eq. (a47). Therefore, firm 1 will not charge a price below 1 A p , the price that 
ensures the customer buys from firm 1, where: 
 
()
c z z c z p
z z c z c p
B A A
B A A A
+ + ′ − − − =
+ ′ − + − − = ′ + −
2 2 1
2 2 2 1
) 1 )( 1 ( i.e.,









z z c p z
A B B
B B A B
+ − ′ =
′ = ′ − + + −
2 2 1







Intuitively, if firm 2 charges  1 B p , it obtains firm 1’s customer provided that the 
customer is ready to switch (i.e., with probability z), obtaining period 1 profits of  ). ( 1 c p z B −  
With probability z, therefore, this firm 2 also owns this customer at the beginning of period 2, 
in which case expected profits are  2 A zπ . On the other hand, if the customer is a non-switcher 
(with probability 1-z), firm 2 obtains zero profits during period 1 and expected profits of  2 B π′  
the next period (note that, in this case, either a revenue expansion or a cost reduction effect 
that favors firm 1 applies in period 2). The sum of these profits must at least equal the 
“assured” period 2 profits from the customer if the customer remained with firm 1 during 
period 1 (i.e.,   2 B π′ ). 
Now, if  1 1 B A p p ≤ −γ , there is a pure strategy equilibrium in period 1, where firm 1 
retains its customer for sure. In this equilibrium: 
  1 1 1 1 ; B B B A p p p p = + = γ  [a54] 
Correspondingly, 
  0 ; 1 1 1 = − + = B B A c p π γ π  [a55]) 
The (expected) total two period profits to firms 1 and 2 from the customer who is 
“owned” by firm 1 at the outset of period 1 are, respectively: 
  =
−CLV CLV
A π 2 1 A B c p π γ ′ + − +   [a56] 
  =
−CLV CLV
B π 2 B π′  [a57] 
Since each firm begins the game with one customer, the total profits of each firm are 
(summing a56 and a57): 
=
−CLV CLV π 2 2 1 B A B c p π π γ ′ + ′ + − + = 2 γ π π π + − ′ + ′ 2 2 2 A A B   [a58] 
 
Now, there is a mixed strategy equilibrium in period 1 if  1 1 B A p p > −γ . On 
substitution, this condition can be expressed for the revenue expansion case as: 









2 3 4 2 1
z z
z z z z z c
 [a59-a] 33 
 
The corresponding condition for the cost reduction effect is: 









1 2 4 3 2 1
z z
z zc z z z c
 [a59-b] 
Interestingly, the conditions that support customer churn in period 2 in the revenue 
expansion and cost reduction cases, i.e., () ( ) γ δ > + − − ) 1 ( 1 1 z c  and () ( ) γ δ > + − − − c c z c 1 1,  
respectively dominate conditions a59-a and a59-b. Stated differently, when a mixed strategy 
equilibrium exists in period 2, such an equilibrium will always exist in period 1. Therefore, 
we can ignore the pure strategy case (i.e., eq. a58) and focus on the mixed strategy outcome. 
Let  () ( ) p p p H A A ≥ = 1 1 Pr  and  () ( ) p p p H B B ≥ = 1 1 Pr . The total two period profits to 




A π  
2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 ) ( )] ( 1 [ ) 1 ( ) )]( ( 1 [ A A B B A B A A A B p H z p H z z c p p H z z π γ π γ π γ ′ − + − − + ′ − + − − + −     
   [a60] 
=
−CLV CLV
B π 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 ) 1 ( )] ( 1 [ ] ) ( [ ) ( B B B A A B B A z p H z c p p H z π π γ π γ ′ − + ′ + − + + − +  
=  2 1 1 2 1 1 1 )] ( 1 [ ] ) ( [ ) ( B B A A B B A p H z c p p H z π γ π γ ′ + − + + − +  [a61] 
 
Note that 1 ) ( , 0 ) 1 ( 1 1 1 = − = − γ γ A B B p H H and  1 ) ( 1 1 = A A p H . Evaluating eq. [a60] 
at 1 1 = A p : 
  =
−CLV CLV
A π 2 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( B A z z c z π π + ′ − + − −     [a62] 
Evaluating eq. (a61) at  γ − = = 1 1 1 A B B p p p : 
  =
−CLV CLV
B π 2 2 1 ) 1 ( ) ( B A A z z c p z π π γ ′ − + + − −  
 =  z [ 2 2 ) 1 )( 1 ( B A z z c z π π + ′ − − − 2 2 ) 1 ( )] B A z z π π γ ′ − + + −  [a63] 
Since each firm begins the game with one customer, the expected total profits of 
each firm in the mixed strategy case are (summing a62 and a63): 
=
−CLV CLV π 2 2
2
2 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( B A B A z z z z z z z c z z π π π π γ ′ − + ′ − − + + + + − − + −  [a64] 
Note that in the total profit expressions (i.e., eqs. [a58] and [a64]),  2 A π  and  2 B π  
must be substituted from [a46] and [a47], and  2 A π′  and  2 A π′  must be substituted either from 




Here, managers in both firms are rotated between periods, and each manager 
maximizes per-period profits. Therefore, the outcomes of the first period of competition are 34 
 
identical to those obtained in the benchmark case without either cost reduction or revenue 
expansion effects (see Appendix B1). However, these strategies employed during the first 
period impact switching behavior during that period, and hence the “opening scenario” for 
period 2. From Section B1, we have the following characterization of the (mixed strategy) 
equilibrium during period 1 for () ( ) γ δ > + − − ) 1 ( 1 1 z c  when the revenue expansion effect 
applies. [Note: The corresponding condition when a cost reduction effect applies is 
() ( ) γ δ > + − − − c c z c 1 1 . These conditions ensure that switching is possible in period 2. The 
conditions that ensure switching in period 1 are obtained by substituting  0 = δ in these 
expressions. It is easy to verify that such substitution yields weaker conditions. Therefore, a 
mixed strategy equilibrium exists in both periods.]  
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1 c p
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p H B γ
γ 1 ) 1 (
1  [a65] 
 ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 c z A − − = π  and  ] ) 1 )( 1 [( 1 γ π − − − = c z z B  (a66) 
  c c z pA + − − = ) 1 )( 1 ( 1  and  γ − + − − = c c z pB ) 1 )( 1 ( 1  (a67) 
Whether either a revenue expansion or a cost reduction effect applies in period 2 
depends on whether or not switching occurs during period 1. Profits when one or the other of 
the effects applies are in eqs. [a48] to [a51]. Profits when neither effect applies are in eq. 
[a66]. 
From [a65], we have: 
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γ  [a68] 
Now, period 2 profits have to be adjusted by the switching probabilities. The 
probability the customer of firm 1 remains with the same firm during period 2 depends 
both  on the probability that the customer is a non-switcher, and the probability that if 
the customer is a switcher, the price differential between the firms is sufficiently low that the 
customer does not switch. Correspondingly, this probability is: 
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 [a69] 













1 1 2 1
) 1 )( 1 (













γ ψ    






























) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 )( 1 (
Log ) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 )( 1 (
2    [a70] 
Note that we have adjusted for firm 1’s probability mass point at  1 1 = A p  here. 
When the customer does switch, firm 1 obtains an expected profit of  2 B π  from that customer 
in period 2. Therefore, firm 1’s total profits from the customer it owns at the outset of period 1 
are: 
  2 2 2 1 1 B A A
ST ST
A π ψ π ψ π π + ′ + =
−  [a71] 35 
 
Here, appropriate substitutions can be made from eqs. [a46] to [a51].  
Next consider the customer who is with firm 2 at the outset of period 1. Firm 1’s 
expected profits from this customer during period 1 are  . 1 B π  The probability that this 
customer remains with firm 2 during period 2 depends both on the probability that the 
customer is a non-switcher, and the probability that, if the customer is a potential switcher, 
price differentials are sufficiently low that the customer does not switch. Correspondingly, 
this probability is: 
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 [ a72]   
Likewise, the probability that this customer does switch to firm 1 is denoted by: 
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2  [a73] 
Note that while we have arrived at these switching probabilities via different routes, 
reassuringly we have that  1 1 µ ψ =  and  2 2 µ ψ = . This is to be expected with symmetric firms. 
The total profits that accrue to firm 1 from the customer owned by firm 2 at the outset of 
period 1 are: 
  2 2 2 1 1 A B B
ST ST
B π µ π µ π π + ′ + =
−  [a74] 
Now, firms 1 and 2 each own a customer at the beginning of period 1. Therefore, the 
total profits of each firm are the sum of profits from its own customer and that of its 
competitor: 
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A π ψ π ψ π π π + ′ + = +
− − + 2 2 2 1 1 A B B π µ π µ π + ′ +  [a75]   























− − − + − − −




δ γ γ γ γ
γ
) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 )( 1 (
Log ) ) 1 )( 1 )(( 2 1 ( ) 1 (







z c z z c
z c z z z z c z z c























− − − + − − −




δ γ γ γ γ
γ
) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 )( 1 (
Log ) ) 1 )( 1 )(( 2 1 )( 1 (







z c z z c c
z c z z z z c z z c
   [a77] 